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STANGE, A. *Die Montan-Industrie Deutschlands unter Berücksichtigung ihres Bergbau und Hütten-Industrie.* (Berlin: Adler-Verlag. Pp. xi, 418. 15 m.)

————— *First report of the proceedings of the development commissioners for the period from May 12, 1910, to March 31, 1911.* (London: P. S. King. 1911. Pp. 199. 3d.)

Among the topics treated are the policy in regard to agricultural development and forestry, improvement of fisheries and harbours, and inland navigation.

————— *Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der deutschen Industrie und Landwirtschaft.* Verhandlungen der 39. Plenarversammlung des deutschen Landwirtschaftsrats 1911. (Berlin: P. Parey. 1911. Pp. 40. 1.20 m.)

————— *Sugar growing in Britain: its effects on agriculture and rural life.* (London: Britain Sugar Beet Council. 1911. 6d.)

————— *National problems affecting the lumber industry: official report, ninth annual convention, National Lumber Manufacturers' Association, held in Chicago, May 24-25, 1911.* (Tacoma: National Lumber Manufacturers' Association. 1911. Pp. 278. \$1.00.)

The subjects discussed include chiefly the conservation of forest resources, workmen's compensation, practical forestry, scientific management as applied to the lumber industry, the Panama Canal and the railroads in relation to the lumber industry. The private view point prevails, and the papers are quite uneven in merit; but on the whole the volume is well worth attention. It is especially notable for showing, in a striking way, how absurd is the attempt to conserve the forests while maintaining competition.

## Transportation and Communication

### A COMMUNICATION.

Mr. E. R. Dewsnap, in his review of my volume on *American Railway Problems* published in the March number of the AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW unfortunately has given members of the Association, and other readers of our official publication, a wholly misleading idea of the nature of my work. My critic has a quite extraordinary gift for mentioning some utterly inconsequential detail in such a way as almost irresistibly to suggest a vitally important inference which is the reverse of the reality.

As to his complaint that I did not devote more attention and space to the consideration of such matters as "the present state of efficiency of French Railroad companies," "the real significance of the purchase of the western company," "the Sherman Act," and

"national control of capitalization," I need only remark that I make no attempt to write an exhaustive treatise on the railroad problem, nor did I endeavor to convey the impression that I had made such an attempt. It was stated clearly in the preface that my purpose was to discuss certain of "our most important and least understood railway problems," and in the table of contents a list of these problems was given. It therefore seems fair to insist that I be judged by *what I have said on the subjects which I set out to discuss, rather than what I did not say about matters I did not set out to discuss*, but which I only mentioned casually as they happened to be connected with the problems which were singled out for special consideration.

As to Mr. Dewsnap's criticism of what I actually did say, I should be most happy to take them up and reply to them seriatim, and as a matter of fact, did so in a 2,500-word reply for which the editors of the AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW have been unable to find space. I therefore am compelled to confine myself to one solitary example of his critical methods.

Mr. Dewsnap attacks the position I have taken in regard to railway accidents. I am happy to be able to agree with him that the year 1905 was low-water mark for safety to passengers in American railway travel. But in no conceivable way does the recognition of this fact break the force of anything said by me in my chapters on railway accidents, as he so ingeniously infers. I stated that for a number of years travel had been getting steadily more dangerous up to 1905, with a slight improvement in 1906 and a discouraging relapse in 1907. I therefore suggested that the Federal Government ought to take vigorous steps to do away with all such accidents as are preventable at a reasonable cost. If there is any weak spot in this statement of facts or in this demand for reform, Mr. Dewsnap has failed to point it out. Having access to later statistics than were available when I wrote my chapters on railway accidents, those for 1908 and 1909, he calls attention to the fact that, "there has been an almost uninterrupted improvement since 1905," but seems to overlook the all-important fact that *this improvement is very largely the result of governmental compulsion and the influence of an aroused public sentiment, rather than of railroad initiative.*

Unfortunately, moreover, the improvement in the accident record for employees is not as marked as in that for passengers. The years 1908 and 1909 show no improvement over 1905 in the per-

centage of employees injured, and the decrease in the percentage of employees killed was due largely to the decrease in the volume of traffic and the consequent decrease in the number of employees required for those years; the number of employees required for 1908 being 235,799 less, and for 1909 being 169,251 less than for 1907.

Moreover, the figures for 1910, which it would appear Mr. Dews-nup has not seen, seem to indicate *a very discouraging relapse* on the part of railways; the number of killed among passengers and employees having risen from 2,791 in 1909 to 3,868 in 1910 and the number of injured having increased from 63,920 in 1909 to 84,440 in 1910—an increase in one year of nearly  $33\frac{1}{3}$  per cent in the injured, and of over  $33\frac{1}{2}$  per cent in the killed. Try as railroad apologists may, the disgraceful fact cannot be denied or explained away that we are still behind nearly all the other civilized nations in the matter of safety in railway travel and employment.

As to Mr. Dews-nup's inference that England's record is more satisfactory than are those of the various continental state lines, I can only say that there exists no statistical justification for any such inference. In the comparisons which I made (p. 185) as to the relative safety of railway travel in the United States, Belgium, Germany and Austria, I did not include England for the simple reason that it was impossible to get statistics as to the "number of passenger miles travelled for each passenger killed" in England, which undoubtedly is the fairest and most satisfactory basis upon which a comparison can be made. But it is only fair to add that *such statistics as are available, go to show* that the English railway accident record is decidedly less satisfactory than is that of the state-owned roads of Germany or Belgium. A careful comparison of the accident statistics of British and German railways, recently has been published in the 1911 Report of the Minister of Public Works in Prussia (1900-1910). On pp. 240 et seq. the whole matter is gone into in great detail, and so far as the figures are available, they are very decidedly against England and in favor of Prussia, as well as of Germany as a whole.

Mr. Dews-nup's remark about the "contradiction afforded by the Belgian private companies" in the matter of railroad accidents, is about as happy as is that concerning the English accident record. In neither case does he seem to have based his assumption upon an examination of the facts.

Perhaps this one highly typical example of Mr. Dewsnap's work may be sufficient to enable the reader to make a fair estimate of the scientific value of his critical conclusions.

CARL VROOMAN.

*Report of the Barge Canal Terminal Commission of the State of New York.* Two volumes. (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company, State Printers. 1911. Pp. 521; 637.)

A commission was appointed in 1909 to devise a plan for the construction of terminals for the new Erie Canal, for which the State of New York is expending \$108,000,000. As the commission reports, a waterway is as useless as a railway, without terminal facilities; a transportation system consists of both roadbed and terminals. By terminals is meant the provision of facilities for longer or shorter storage, under shelter, and for transshipment from the waterway to the rail and ocean carriers.

The commission recognizes the importance of coöperation between rail and water carriers. It explains that the canal will never interchange freight with the railways and the lake boats in Buffalo unless physical contact is secured between the canal boat and the railway car, the canal boat and the lake steamer, the canal boat and the warehouse. This contact is now almost completely lacking. There are few grain elevators in Buffalo which deliver grain to canal boats except at the bidding of the railroads. But this physical contact between car and canal boat in Buffalo will not suffice. The railroads must be compelled by legislative enactment to prorate and throughrate with the canal lines, just as they do with their most favored railway friends.

This part of the program is the crux of the whole matter. It is easily possible to construct a canal terminal in Buffalo and compel the railroads either to run their lines into it or build a belt line connecting with them. It will be most difficult to compel a railroad rate policy which will condemn the railroads to hauls ending at Buffalo. In the decision that the long and short haul clause of the Interstate Commerce Act does not apply when water competition is present, the prerogative of the railway to compete against the waterway was established.

The report recommends a bill, since passed by the legislature, appropriating \$16,500,000 for the construction of terminals in Buffalo, various points on the new Erie Canal and in New York city. In New York there is to be provided at the north end of